Truter v Deysel
South African legal case / From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Truter and Another v Deysel is an important case in South African law, with particular resonance in civil procedure and medical malpractice. It is also frequently quoted or invoked for its definition of "cause of action". It was heard in the Supreme Court of Appeal on 24 February 2006; judgment was delivered by Judge of Appeal Belinda van Heerden on 17 March.[1] The case was an appeal from a decision in the Cape Provincial Division of the High Court of South Africa.
Truter v Deysel | |
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Court | Supreme Court of Appeal (South Africa) |
Full case name | Truter and Another v Deysel |
Decided | 17 March 2006 |
Docket nos. | 043/05 |
Citation(s) | [2006] ZASCA 16; 2006 (4) SA 168 (SCA) |
Case history | |
Appealed from | Deysel v Truter and Another 2005 (5) SA 598 (C) in the High Court of South Africa, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting | Harms JA, Zulman JA, Navsa JA, Mthiyane JA and van Heerden JA |
Case opinions | |
Decision by | Van Heerden JA (unanimous) |
Keywords | |
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The plaintiff's claim was based on delict for personal injury sustained seven years earlier. The case turned on the question of when exactly, in terms of the Prescription Act, 1969, the period of prescription commences. The court held that prescription begins to run when the creditor acquires knowledge, or is deemed to have acquired knowledge, of "the facts from which the debt arises": the creditor acquires a complete cause of action for the recovery of debt when he is in possession of the entire set of facts upon which he relies to prove his claim. The cause of action is therefore complete as soon as the creditor sustains some harm; knowledge of fault or unlawfulness is not required. In this case, therefore, prescription was not delayed by the plaintiff's delay in securing an expert opinion to the effect that the defendants' conduct was negligent; an expert opinion of that kind did not constitute a fact, but instead was evidence.