Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Anthony Page
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Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989),[1] is a case that was tried in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which dealt with the issue of whether a plaintiff's telephone number, which translates into a generic term, is entitled to judicial protection when a second comer tries to use a confusingly similar number.[1]
Quick Facts Dial-A-Mattress Franchise v. Anthony Page, Court ...
Dial-A-Mattress Franchise v. Anthony Page | |
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Court | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit |
Full case name | "Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corporation v. Anthony Page, dba Easy Associates, Page Industries, and Easy Bed, and Easy Bed, Incorporated" |
Started | June 2, 1989 (1989-06-02) |
Decided | July 27, 1989 (1989-07-27) |
Citation(s) | 880 F.2d 675; 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1644 |
Case history | |
Prior history | Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York |
Court membership | |
Judge(s) sitting | Jon Ormond Newman, Roger Jeffrey Miner, Robert J. Ward |
Case opinions | |
Although one company’s use of a generic term does not preclude competitors to use the term for their own business purposes, it does not mean competitors may use the term to deceive the public with a confusingly similar use of that term. | |
Laws applied | |
28 U.S.C. § 1654 |
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