Virginia v. Black
2003 United States Supreme Court case / From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 5–4, that any state statute banning cross burning on the basis that it constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate is a violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Such a provision, the Court argued, blurs the distinction between proscribable "threats of intimidation" and the Ku Klux Klan's protected "messages of shared ideology". In the case, three defendants were convicted in two separate cases of violating a Virginia statute against cross burning. However, cross-burning can be a criminal offense if the intent to intimidate is proven. It was argued by former Solicitor General of Virginia, William Hurd and Rodney A. Smolla.
Virginia v. Black | |
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Argued December 11, 2002 Decided April 7, 2003 | |
Full case name | Virginia v. Barry Elton Black, Richard J. Elliott, and Jonathan S. O'Mara |
Docket no. | 01-1107 |
Citations | 538 U.S. 343 (more) 123 S. Ct. 1536; 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 |
Argument | Oral argument |
Opinion announcement | Opinion announcement |
Case history | |
Prior | On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 553 S.E.2d 738 (2001) |
Subsequent | Appeal after remand at Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 464, 593 S.E.2d 263 (2004) |
Holding | |
Virginia's particular statute against cross burning is unconstitutional because its prima facie evidence presumption places the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate that he has not intended the cross burning as intimidation. However, a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | O'Connor (Parts I, II, III), joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Breyer |
Plurality | O'Connor (Parts IV, V), joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Breyer |
Concurrence | Stevens |
Concur/dissent | Scalia (concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part), joined by Thomas (Parts I, II) |
Concur/dissent | Souter (concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg |
Dissent | Thomas |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. I |