User:SlimVirgin/AR draft
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Animal rights, also known as animal liberation, is the idea that some or all non-human animals are entitled to the possession of their own lives, and that their most basic interests—such as an interest in not suffering—should be afforded the same consideration as the similar interests of human beings.[3] Advocates oppose the assignment of moral value and fundamental protections on the basis of species membership alone, an idea known as speciesism, arguing that it is a prejudice as irrational as any other. They agree for the most part that animals should no longer be viewed as property, or used as food, clothing, research subjects, or entertainment.[4]
Animal rights | |
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File:Shanghai-monkey cropped.jpg | |
Description | Non-human animals have interests, and those interests ought not to be discriminated against on the basis of species membership alone.[2] |
Early proponents | Henry Salt (1851–1939) Lizzy Lind af Hageby (1878–1963) Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) |
Notable academic proponents | Stephen R. L. Clark, David DeGrazia, Gary Francione, Robert Garner, Rosalind Hursthouse, Andrew Linzey, Mary Midgley, Martha Nussbaum, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin, Mark Rowlands, Steve Sapontzis, Peter Singer, Cass Sunstein, Steven M. Wise |
List | List of animal rights advocates |
Key texts | Henry Salt's Animals' Rights (1894) Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (1975) Tom Regan's The Case for Animal Rights (1983) |
Advocates approach the issue from a variety of philosophical and political positions. Protectionists seek incremental reform in how animals are treated, with a view to ending animal use entirely, or almost entirely. This view is represented by the philosopher Peter Singer, whose focus as a utilitarian is not on moral rights, but on the argument that animals have interests, particularly an interest in not suffering, and that there is no moral or logical reason not to award those interests equal consideration. The abolitionist position is that animals do have moral rights, which the pursuit of incremental reform fails to respect; protectionism may even worsen the position of animals by encouraging human beings to feel comfortable about using them. This position is represented by the philosopher Tom Regan, who as a deontologist argues that at least some animals are "subjects-of-a-life," with beliefs, desires, memories, and a sense of their own future, who must be treated as ends in themselves, not as a means to an end.[5]
In parallel to the debate about moral rights, animal law is now widely taught in law schools in North America, and several prominent legal scholars support the extension of basic legal rights and personhood to at least some animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are bonobos and chimpanzees. This is supported by some animal rights academics because it would break through the species barrier, but opposed by others because it predicates moral value on mental complexity, rather than on sentience alone.[6]
Critics of animals rights argue that animals are unable to enter into a social contract, and thus cannot be possessors of rights, a view summed up by the philosopher Roger Scruton, who writes that only humans have duties, and therefore only humans have rights.[7] A parallel argument, known as the animal welfare position, is that animals may be used as resources so long as there is no unnecessary suffering; they may have some moral standing, but they are inferior in status to human beings, and insofar as they have interests, those interests may be overridden, though what counts as necessary suffering or a legitimate sacrifice of interests varies considerably.[8] Certain forms of animal rights activism, in particular the destruction of fur farms and animal laboratories by the Animal Liberation Front, have also attracted criticism, including from within the animal rights movement itself.[9]