User:Cplakidas/Sandbox/Byzantine-Arab3
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Since the abating of the Muslim conquests in the early 8th century, the Arab–Byzantine wars had featured constant raids and counter-raids along a relatively static border roughly defined by the line of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus Mountains.[1] Until the 860s, superior Muslim armies had placed the Byzantines on the defensive. Only after 863, with the victory in the Battle of Lalakaon, did the Byzantines gradually regain some lost ground against the Muslims, launching ever-deeper raids into Syria and Upper Mesopotamia and annexing the Paulician state around Tephrike (now Divriği).[2] Furthermore, according to historian Mark Whittow, "by 912 the Arabs had been pinned back behind the Taurus and Anti-Taurus", encouraging the Armenians to switch their allegiance from the Abbasid Caliphate to the Empire, in whose service they entered in increasing numbers.[3] The revival of Byzantine power was further facilitated by the progressive decline of the Abbasid Caliphate itself, particularly under al-Muqtadir (r. 908–932), when the central government faced several revolts. In the periphery of the Caliphate, the weakening of central control allowed the emergence of semi-autonomous local dynasties.[4] In addition, after the death of the Bulgarian Tsar Simeon in 927, a peace treaty with the Bulgarians allowed the Empire to shift attention and resources to the East.[5]
Byzantine-Arab Wars, 867–1050s(? split in 976?) | |||||||
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Part of the Byzantine-Arab Wars | |||||||
Depiction of a clash between Byzantine and Arabs, from the Madrid Skylitzes manuscript | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Abbasid Caliphate (until ca. 945) Border emirates (Thughur) Tulunids Ikhshidids Emirate of Aleppo (from 945) Emirate of Mosul Fatimid Caliphate Emirate of Crete | Byzantine Empire |
On wars in the East after 960, see Honigmann (1935), pp.91-118, after that w. the Turks
Maniakes against Edessa &c, Honigmann (1935), pp. 134-139
Armenia, Honigmann (1935), pp. 147-177
Since the introduction of the "Turkish" corps by caliph al-MU'tasimIn fact, experience was to prove that, having the sovereign in their power,they were to be far less tolerable and far more devoted to their own generals than to the Caliph (who, after al-Muctasim, never again commanded them directly). Nevertheless, because of theirtechnical qualifications, because of the care bestowed by the Turkish chieftains on maintaining recruitment,and even because the acquisition of new slaves was the easiest remedy against the lack of discipline ofthe old ones (although in the long run, of course, it merely perpetuated the evil), it seemed no longer possible, right up to modern times, for oriental Muslim states to do without a Turkish army, and all of them, one after another, were to adopt one. At best, in the orient, they were counter-balanced by the calling in of other elements, rough, indigenous mountain people, skilled in fighting on foot in the mountains, such as the Daylamls, or horsemen like the Kurds, or locally negroes (in Arabia) or Hindus (army of the Ghaznavids). In Egypt, the Fatimids,who conquered it with Berber contingents, reinforced as in Ifrikiya with negroes, Slavs and Rumis, themselves later tried to neutralize these by introducing Turks, whom in turn they sought to replace by Armenians under chiefs who could hardly be claimed as Muslims, and finally gave back some part in army affairs to the Arabs. The breaking up of the cAbbasid empire also gave the opportunity of a military career to the Arabs of Mesopotamia and Syria, who gave support to the Hamdanid [q.v.], Mirdasid [q.v.~], cUkaylid [q.v.] and other principalities. The Buyids in western Iran owed their specific strength to the Daylamls, but the need for cavalry compelled them never- theless to reinforce them from the start with Turks. But the racial differences of the contingents, which language and technical differences hindered from mixing easily together, were the cause of disorders, because they were jealous of each other, quarrelled over their share of the state revenues, and espoused the disagreements of their leaders; they made the streets of Baghdad and Cairo run with blood when they were not occupied in promoting their respective generals to power [6]
This entailed a sharp rise in costs: in the 10th century, a professional soldier in the Abbasid army earned two to three times as much as a common labourer, and the amount paid for army salaries, armament production and the other costs associated with military requirements accounted for more than half the budget of the Caliphate.[7]
At the turn of the 10th century, the Byzantines continued to regard the Arabs as their principal foes. When Emperor Leo VI the Wise wrote his Tactica, he says that he did so on account of the peril represented by the Arab raids. The emperor is careful to emphasize the resilience and discipline of the Arabs in battle, but also highlights the differences between them and the Byzantine army: the Arabs are motivated by faith and raid chiefly to win loot; unlike the Byzantine levies, they are not obliged to military service but largely volunteers.[8] The respect towards their eastern adversary is evidenced in the protocols for imperial receptions: the "Eastern Muslims" are accorded the first place immediately after any ecclesiastical officials, enjoying precedence over the Bulgarians or the Franks.[9] Relations were also civilized in the matter of prisoners of war. Arab prisoners were usually paraded in a triumphal procession but otherwise generally well treated. Senior figures were treated as honoured guests and kept at one of the prisons of the Great Palace of Constantinople, from where they were regularly invited to attend races at the Hippodrome of Constantinople or imperial banquets on Easter and Christmas—which, as they were assured on oath, contained no pork—and given gifts as part of imperial ceremonies.[10] An effort was made to induce the ordinary prisoners to convert to Christianity, in which case they were given lands to settle, but otherwise they enjoyed the freedom to worship at mosques in Constantinople. According to Muqaddasi, many were enslaved and forced to work in manufactures, but were still well treated by the Byzantines, who "do not force any of them to eat pork, and they do not slit their noses or their tongues".[11] Ibn Hawqal reports that there were also provincial prisons, in the Thracesian, Opsician and Bucellarian themes, in addition to those in Constantinople, and judged the first two to be the mildest, as the prisoners were not even kept in chains. On the other hand, he comments on the dreaded Noumera prison in Constantinople that it is "harsh, depressing and dark".[12]
Indeed, it was in the interest of the Byzantine government to be solicitous for the welfare of its Muslim prisoners, as reports of mistreatment would bring repercussions on Byzantine prisoners in Arab hands, as well as the Christian populations of Syria and Palestine living under Muslim rule.[13] Both sides also engaged in regular exchanges of prisoners (ἀλλάγια, allagia, in Greek), which took place on the river Lamos in Cilicia, on the border between Byzantium and the Caliphate. A truce was arranged, and both sides met on the river. The exchange was made man for man, as illustrated by al-Tabari in his report of the 845 exchange: Two bridges were built over the river, one for the prisoners of each side. Each side released one prisoner, who walked across the bridge simultaneously with his counterpart. After the exchange was complete, the surplus prisoners were either ransomed for money or exchanged for slaves.[14][15]